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Case Digest

The purpose of the Case Digest is to identify and summarize for the reader
those recent and interesting cases that have less significance than those that merit
an in-depth analysis. Included in the digest are cases that apply established legal
principles without necessarily introducing new ones.
This digest includes cases reported from May through November, 1972. The
Spring issue will include cases reported from December, 1972, through April, 1973.
The cases are grouped into topical categories, and references are given for further
research. It is hoped that attorneys, judges, teachers and students will find that
this digest facilitates research in problems involving aspects of transnational law.
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1.
A

FEDERAL COURT Is

ADMIRALTY

NOT COMPELLED

To

ASSERT ITS ADMIRALTY

JURISDICTION WHEN THE LITIGANTS HAVE INSUFFICIENT CONTACTS
WITH THE UNITED STATES OR WHEN A GOOD FAITH CLAIM FOR
EARNED WAGES IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE

Plaintiff, a Greek seaman, brought an admiralty action in rem
against the vessel and in personam against the vessel's corporate
owner, its master, and the corporation's New York area shipping
agent. Plaintiff was injured while aboard the vessel in international
waters and was subsequently discharged from the vessel in Adak,
Alaska, for emergency medical treatment. Shortly thereafter, he
returned to Greece at his employer's expense. The libel contained four
counts: (1) earned wages; (2) statutory penalties for failure to pay
earned wages; (3) unseaworthiness under general maritime law and
negligence under the Jones Act; (4) maintenance and cure under
general maritime law. Defendants moved to dismiss the libel on the
grounds that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over defendants,
that plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted, that plaintiff had agreed to litigate all claims in Greece, and
on the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The district court, following
the "contacts" test established in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571
(1953), determined that the litigants' contacts with the United States
were minimal; moreover, the court was not compelled to assert its
jurisdiction under 46 U.S.C. §§ 596, 597 (1970) because plaintiff had
failed to assert and prove a "good faith" claim for earned wages.
Finally, the court held that it was not a convenient forum in which to
litigate the question of liability under foreign (Liberian) maritime law.
Mihalinos v. Liberian S.S. Trikala, 342 F. Supp. 1237 (S.D. Cal.
1972).

GUILTY OF DERELECTION IN ITS NONDELEGABLE DUTY
FURNISH A SEAWORTHY VESSEL HELD NOT ENTITLED TO INDEMNI-

SHIPOWNER

To

FICATION

Defendant, Coral Drilling Company, was under contract to Shell Oil
Company for the drilling of a well off the Louisiana coast. Defendant
Baroid was employed to supply Coral's operation and to transport
drilling mud to the well on the M/V Baroid Rocket. Plaintiff, a
roustabout in the employ of a Baroid contractor, was injured while
attempting to offload the Baroid vessel at Coral's drilling site. On the
night of plaintiff's injury, the captain of the Baroid Rocket neglected
to have his cargo of palleted sacked mud lashed to the deck to prevent
Fall, 1972
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shifting, tied the vessel to the drilling rig stern with swells rising up to
twelve feet, and allowed the Coral crew to direct the offloading of his
vessel. Rather than reload spilled pallets in a comparatively safe
position farther forward, an operation that would have caused the
roustabouts to cross a deck made slippery by mud spillage, Coral's
foreman directed the repalleting at the stern of the vessel, where
plaintiff was injured by a pallet thrown against him by a wave. The
Federal district court, exercising its jurisdiction in admiralty, concluded that Coral did not breach its warranty of workmanlike
performance when it elected to unload the vessel under the prevailing
circumstances, since reporting the condition of the deck to the ship's
captain would merely have called his attention to a fact that he
already knew. Consequently, Baroid's negligent and improper loading
of the deck cargo, and the captain's complete indifference to the
safety of Coral's roustabouts, demonstrated by mooring the vessel as
he did, constituted a failure to furnish a seaworthy vessel and an
obstruction of Coral's ability to provide safe working conditions. The
court held that Baroid must indemnify Coral for its expenditures
under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,
33 U.S.C. § 933 (1971), and must fully compensate plaintiff for his
injuries.' Brock v. BaroidDivision of National Lead Co., 339 F. Supp.
728 (W.D. La. 1972).
1. Note that Congress recently has abrogated the availability of the doctrine of
seaworthiness to longshoremen and other harbor workers injured on board ship.
See Comment, supra p. 257. Longshoremen and other harbor workers can,
however, still recover against the shipowner in a negligence action; but no longer
can the shipowner bring a third-party indemnity action against the stevedore for
breach of its warranty of workmanlike performance. Id.

INJUNCTION FOR THE REMOVAL OF A DAMAGED VESSEL CANNOT BE
GRANTED IN A DIRECT ADMIRALTY PROCEEDING FOR THAT PURPOSE

In an action alleging the negligent burning and sinking of plaintiff's
vessel at defendant's wharf, defendant, having raised the vessel, denied
negligent culpability and sought a mandatory injunction to have the
ship removed from his premises. Defendant argued that an injunction
could be granted under either the court's pendant jurisdiction, the
court having legitimately assumed admiralty jurisdiction over the
maritime tort, or under its ancillary jurisdiction, as a result of the
extension of the right to counterclaim to admiralty cases by FED. R.
Civ. P. 13. The district court, however, refused to extend Romero v.
Vol. 6-No. 1
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International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), which
had allowed the issuance of an injunction where the party seeking
equitable relief alleged a state claim related to the pending federal
maritime cause of action. The court concluded that the injunction
sought in the instant case could be characterized only as an
independent equity action and was precluded on the basis of the
court's power to grant adequate relief solely in admiralty. Moreover,
the court held that because the merger of the federal rules did not
create new substantive admiralty causes of action, it had no ancillary
jurisdiction to issue the mandatory injunction. Finally, assuming that
it had the power to force the removal of plaintiff's vessel, the court
noted that no injunction could issue until there had been a
determination of fault in the tort action. Nyon Technical Commercial
Inc. v. EquitableEquip. Co., 341 F. Supp. 777 (E.D. La. 1972).

SHIPOWNER'S

LIABILITY

FOR DAMAGE

TO GOODS Is

NOT LIMITED

UNDER

EITHER THE CARRIAGE OF GOODS BY SEA ACT OR THE FIRE
STATUTE WHEN
OWNER FAILED TO EQUIP THE VESSEL WITH ADEQUATE MEANS FOR FIGHTING FIRE

Plaintiff sued in admiralty for cargo damage as a result of an engine
room fire aboard defendant's vessel. All of the equipment available for
fighting an engine room fire was located in, or controlled from, the
engine room, making its use impossible. The court found that the fire
could have been extinguished had there been an emergency fire-fighting system outside the engine room and held that the vessel was
unseaworthy because defendant shipowner failed to exercise due
diligence in equipping the vessel. In addition, the court determined
that the fire was caused by the "design or neglect" and the actual
fault or privity of the defendant and, therefore, defendant was not
exempt from liability for the damage under either the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) (1971) or the Fire Statute,
46 U.S.C. § 182 (1971). Asbestos Corp. Ltd. v. Compagnie de
Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre, 345 F. Supp. 814 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
NEGLIGENT SEAMAN'S FAILURE To PERFORM DUTIES OF HIS EMPLOYMENT BARS RECOVERY OF DAMAGES IN ADMIRALTY

Appellant, chief mate on a vessel owned by the United States,
suffered a hernia when he fell through a hole in the flooring sheathing
Fall, 1972
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aboard ship and sued in admiralty on the theory of unseaworthiness
for lost wages and other damages. As chief mate, appellant was
responsible for inspecting the vessel and for making any repairs
necessary to maintain seaworthiness. The court, citing Walker v. Lykes
Bros. S.S. Co., 193 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1952), held that appellant was
barred from recovering damages since the vessel's unseaworthy
condition was caused by the breach of his maintenance duties.
Reinhart v. United States, 457 F.2d 151 (9th Cir. 1972).

PRIVATE

CANAL

USED

AS

AN

INSTRUMENT

OF INTERSTATE

COM-

MERCE IS SUBJECT TO CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION UNDER RIVERS
AND HARBORS ACT

Plaintiff brought an action in admiralty for damages to its fender
works resulting from three separate collisions from defendant's barges.
Plaintiff owned a private barge canal of approximately five miles in
length. The canal connected two of plaintiff's plants, located at
opposite ends of the canal, with the Intercoastal Waterway, which, in
turn, gives access to the Gulf of Mexico. The tug was owned by
plaintiff and demise chartered to defendant, who had the exclusive use
of it under time charter in plaintiff's barge canal. Defendant
contended that the terms of the time charter provided it with absolute
immunity against all liability for collision damages and that plaintiff's
failure to secure approval from the Secretary of the Army and the
Chief of Engineers for the construction of the fender system violated
the Rivers and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C.A. § § 401, 402, and caused and
contributed to the collision. The Fifth Circuit held that the only
reasonable interpretation of the equivocal language of the time charter
was that defendant was exempt from all liability for collision damage
except that resulting from the negligence of the master, crew or other
servants of the defendant. The court agreed that plaintiff had
technically violated the Rivers and Harbors Act, but found that the
fender works were not the proximate cause of the collisions and that
the collisions were caused solely by defendant's negligence. Finally, in
response to plaintiff's argument that the Act was inapplicable to its
private canal, the court found that the canal was used as an
instrumentality of interstate commerce and subject to congressional
regulation under the Act. Dow Chemical Co. v. Dixie Carriers, Inc.,
463 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1972).
Vol. 6-No. I
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2. ALIENS
DENIAL TO ADOPTED MINOR ALIENS OF THE PRIVILEGE OF AUTOMATIC CITIZENSHIP ON THE NATURALIZATION or ADOPTIVE PARENTS

Is NOT VIOLATIVE OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
Petitioner, an adopted minor son of naturalized parents, sought
review of his alien deportation order. Respondent had issued the order
pursuant to § 241 (a)(11) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952 following petitioner's narcotics conviction in Texas. Petitioner
claimed that § 321 of the 1952 Act, which grants automatic
citizenship to natural-born children upon the naturalization of their
parents, invidiously discriminated against adopted children in identical
circumstances and thus violated both the equal protection and due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment. Respondent argued that
citizenship, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, is a
privilege conferred by Congress in its discretion; consequently, aliens
have no constitutional right to citizenship. The Board of Immigration
Appeals upheld the deportation order. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
affirmed, holding that Congress may constitutionally deny adopted
children the privilege of automatic citizenship upon the naturalization of their adoptive parents. Hein v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 456 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1972).

DENIAL OF AN EXTENSION OF THE PRIVILEGE OF VOLUNTARY
DEPARTURE DURING THE PERIOD OF APPLICATION FOR AN IMMIGRANT VISA FOUND NEITHER CAPRICIOUS NOR ARBITRARY

Appellant, a Greek national, entered the United States and married
an American citizen. His first wife filed a visa petition on his behalf to
allow his entry into the United States under immediate relative status
as her husband. Subsequently, his wife withdrew the application
because of marital difficulties and deportation proceedings were
commenced. Appellant was repeatedly granted the discretionary
privilege of voluntary departure from the United States, but he
refused to depart. Several months later, appellant's second wife refiled
the application, which was approved and forwarded to Canada;
however, appellant again refused to go to Canada and reenter in
compliance with Service regulations. A third warrant for deportation
was issued and appellant filed a petition for habeas corpus, claiming
that the Immigration Service acted arbitrarily and capriciously in
Fall, 1972
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denying him additional time in which to comply with the voluntary
departure privilege. In addition, appellant contended that the refusal
was contrary to the longstanding policy of the Service of granting
extensions during the period of application for an immigrant visa. The
federal district court denied appellant's petition. On a review of the
record, the court of appeals affirmed on the grounds that the privilege
of voluntary departure had been repeatedly extended to appellant,
that appellant had been afforded procedural due process, and that the
decision to institute deportation proceedings did not constitute
arbitrary or capricious agency action. Vassiliou v. DistrictDirectorof
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 461 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir.
1972).

THE STATE HAS No DUTY TO INFORM AN ALIEN ACcUSED OF A CRIME
THAT DEPORTATION MAY BE A CONSEQUENCE OF A PLEA OF GUILTY

Appellant, an alien, entered a plea of guilty to charges of
possession of marijuana for sale and was convicted, fined and placed
on probation. Subsequently, appellant was informed that his
conviction subjected him to deportation proceedings by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Appellant then filed, inter
alia, a motion to vacate the conviction on the ground that he was not
informed that deportation was a consequence of his guilty plea. The
court of appeals held that the possibility of deportation was not a
"consequence" as to which there was a duty to inform appellant
before the acceptance of his plea of guilty. State v. Rodriguez, 499
P.2d 167, 17 Ariz. App. 553 (1972).

AN ALIEN CANNOT

BE DENIED EMPLOYMENT MERELY BECAUSE SHE

Is

NOT A UNITED STATES CITIZEN

Plaintiff, a resident alien living with her citizen husband in San
Antonio, Texas, sued to enjoin defendant employer from continuing
its policy against hiring aliens. Defendant, a clothing manufacturer,
had refused to hire plaintiff because she was not a citizen of the
United States. The court rejected defendant's attempt to distinguish
citizenship from national origin and held that a refusal to hire solely
because of citizenship was discriminatory conduct based on plaintiff's
"national origin," and was prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1970). Espinoza v. FarahMfg. Co., 343 F.
Supp. 1205 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
Vol. 6-No. 1
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AVOIDANCE
OR EVASION
OF MILITARY SERVICE BY A FORMER
PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN DISQUALIFIES HIM FROM BOTH UNITED
STATES

CITIZENSHIP

AND

ADMISSION

AS

A PERMANENT

RESIDENT

ALIEN

Petitioner, a Peruvian citizen, entered the United States to marry
an American citizen. Changing his status to permanent resident alien
in order to remain in the United States, petitioner became subject to
military conscription. Prior to his induction, he returned to Peru and
changed his classification to draft-exempt, nonimmigrant status. When
he sought reentry to the United States, the Immigration Service,
acting pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a) (22) (1970), permitted him to
remain only for a short time, contending that petitioner was an alien
who had departed the United States in order to evade military service.
Petitioner appealed, arguing that the statute was intended to apply to
"draft dodgers" who intended to return at the cessation of hostilities,
but that he merely desired nonimmigrant status. The court determined
that petitioner was attempting to evade the draft, but that it was
unimportant whether his evasion from military service was lawful or
unlawful since 8 U.S.C. § 1426 (1970) provides that even aliens who
lawfully seek relief from military service are ineligible for United
States citizenship and, therefore, may be properly excluded from
admission as permanent resident aliens. Riva v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d
1121 (3d Cir. 1972).

THE SECRETARY OF LABOR Is

EMPOWERED To DENY PREFERENCE

VISAS TO ALIENS WHEN No SHORTAGE OF DOMESTIC WORKERS ExISTS

Petitioners, Philippine citizens in the United States under
preference visas as teachers, applied for extensions of their expired
visas. Five months after petitioners' applications were filed the
Secretary of Labor began to require submission of letters stating that
applicants have a job offer for a teaching position before extensions of
teacher preference visas would be granted. Petitioners, unable to
obtain teaching offers nine months after their applications were filed,
were ordered by the Immigration Service to show why they had
overstayed their allotted time. Petitioners contended that the nine
month delay by the Immigration Service in the processing of their
applications constituted a denial of due process and gross abuse of
function. The court held that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(14)(1970) clearly
empowers the Secretary of Labor to deny entry to laborers if there is
no domestic shortage of that type of worker. In addition, the court
determined that it did not have jurisdiction to review the orders of the
Fall, 1972
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District Director of Immigration because the petition for review was

brought under 8 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(1970), which provides only for
judicial review of orders of deportation and exclusion. Carino v.

Immigration and NaturalizationServ., 460 F.2d 1341 (7th Cir. 1972).

AN ALIEN WHO Is
SERVICE

IN

THE

NEVER LEGALLY
UNITED

STATES

RELIEVED OF LIABILITY FOR

MILITARY

DOES

NOT LOSE

HIS

ELIGIBILITY FOR CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES

In 1950, plaintiff, a Semitic refugee from World War II Germany
residing in the United States, applied for and received an exemption
from military service as an alien pursuant to section 4(a) of the
Selective Service Act of 1948, 50 U.S.C. § 454(a) (1950), as
amended, 50 U.S.C. § 454 (1970). He recognized at that time that his
action would, under the Immigration and Nationality Act § 315(a), 8
U.S.C. § 1426(a) (1970), preclude him from United States
citizenship. The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951,
50 U.S.C. § 454 (1970), eliminated plaintiff's alien exemption, and,
although he sought further relief as a "treaty" alien protected by the
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Germany,
December 8, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132, 2136 (1923), his Selective Service
Board failed to change his classification from that of an exempt alien
resident. The district court, adhering strictly to the principle of Astrup
v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 402 U.S. 509 (1971), held
that, because of the abrogation by diplomatic fiat, June 2, 1953,
[1954] 5 U.S.T. 828, T.I.A.S. No. 2972, of his 1923 treaty
exemption, he was never legally relieved of his obligation to serve in
the military. Consequently, the failure of his local board to induct him
did not preclude his eligibility for naturalization in the United States.
In re Chrambach, 346 F. Supp. 362 (D. Md. 1972).

NONRESIDENT

ALIEN CORPORATION HAS STANDING

TO CHALLENGE

ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION

Plaintiff CONCICA, a Honduran construction corporation,
submitted the lowest bid to the Central American Bank for Economic
Integration (CABEI), which had obtained a loan from the Agency for
International Development (AID) to finance infrastructure construction projects in Latin America. AID and CABEI were to approve the
contract and contractors. AID's Washington office determined that
CONCICA lacked the corporate experience required by AID
regulations and disallowed the bid. CONCICA challenged the agency
Vol. 6-No. 1
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action in district court. The district court agreed with AID's
contention that the tests for standing to challenge administrative
actions, formulated in Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig, 438 F.2d 1204
(D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. National Industries for Blind
v. BallerinaPen Co., 401 U.S. 950 (1971), were inapplicable because
CONCICA was a nonresident alien, and that consequently CONCICA
lacked standing. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia reversed. The court noted that § 10 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970), logically included persons such
as CONCICA and observed that granting standing probably would not
precipitate a flood of dilatory suits. The court noted also that AID
was required by statute to apply the funds at its disposal in a manner
designed to foster the economic independence of Latin America and
at the same time achieve maximum efficiency for each dollar spent.
Emphasizing that the allowance of CONCICA's suit would foster both
goals, the court concluded that the coalescence of all these factors
required a finding that CONCICA had standing. Constructores Civiles
de Centroamerica,S.A. (CONCICA) v. Hannah, 459 F.2d 1183 (D.C.
Cir. 1972).

3.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

THE OATH OF ALLIEGANCE AS A PREREQUISITE TO THE ISSUANCE OF
A PASSPORT VIOLATES THE RIGHT To TRAVEL GUARANTEED BY THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT

Plaintiff, a United States citizen, mailed an executed application
form to the Passport Office of the United States Department of State,
but refused to swear to or affirm the oath of allegiance. Defendant,
the Secretary of State, required the oath as a prerequisite to the
issuance of a passport. Plaintiff subsequently brought suit in federal
district court, seeking a declaratory judgment that the required oath
was violative of the first and fifth amendments and an unauthorized
requirement under either explicit or implicit statutory authority.
Defendant contended that he, as Secretary of State, had both express
and implied authority to require the oath pursuant to 22 U.S.C. §
211-13 (1971). The court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, holding that
the requirement that United States citizens swear to or affirm the
contents of the oath of allegiance as a prerequisite to the issuance of a
passport both was unauthorized by the statute and unconstitutionally
abridged plaintiff's right to travel guaranteed by the fifth amendment.
Woodward v. Rogers, 344 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1972).
Fall, 1972
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THE

UNITED

STATES

IMPORTATION OF

MAY

ENEMY

CONSTITUTIONALLY

LITERATURE UNDER

RESTRICT

THE

THE TRADING WITH

THE ENEMY ACT

Plaintiff, an antiwar organization, sought to gain possession of Red

Chinese literature forwarded from North Vietnam and to avoid the
licensing requirements of the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C.
App. § 5(b) (1971). The United States Government had confiscated
the publications pending submission by the intended recipients of
information required regarding the addressee's identity and the
intended use of the material. The Act becomes operative only during
time of war or other period of national emergency declared by the
President and applies only to property in which any foreign country
or national has, or has had, an interest. Plaintiff alleged that the
statute unconstitutionally delegated congressional powers without
appropriate standards because, under the Act, the President was given
unreviewable power to declare a national emergency. Plaintiff further
alleged that the Act unconstitutionally imposed prior restraints on
first amendment freedoms in its licensing procedures. The Third
Circuit held that since the legislative design of preventing enemy
nations from deriving economic benefit from transactions with persons
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States was wholly proper as a
weapon in any international struggle, and since the statute provides
guidance to the Office of Foreign Assets Control regarding the
exercise of its functions, plaintiff's first constitutional challenge must
fail. Similarly, the court found that the United States had a
compelling interest in regulating the flow of money to certain
countries and that the loss of plaintiff's anonymity, alleged to induce
a chilling effect on first amendment freedoms, would not outweigh
the Government's interest in preventing American economic support
of her enemies. The duty of disclosure under the Act was not
sufficiently onerous to render its regulations unconstitutional as
applied. Veterans and Reservists for Peace in Vietnam v. Regional
Comm'r., 459 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1972).

CONGRESS

MAY EXCLUDE

ALIENS WITHOUT INFRINGING THE FIRST

AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF CITIZENS WHO WISH TO COMMUNICATE WITH
THE FOREIGN NATIONAL

Plaintiff,

a Belgian citizen and editor of a weekly

socialist

newspaper, was an avowed Marxist, but had been permitted to speak

in the United States in 1962 and 1968 by the Attorney General's
waiver under § 1182 (d) (3) (A) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
Vol. 6-No. 1
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of 1952. His 1969 visa application was denied, however, because of his
alleged affiliation with the world communist movement, and because
his activities in the United States in 1962 and 1968 allegedly went
beyond the scope of his authorization and constituted a flagrant abuse
of the opportunities afforded him to express his views in this country.
Plaintiff brought suit challenging certain sections of the Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ § 1182 (a) (28) (D), (G) (v), (d) (3) (A) (1971), and was joined by
several professors at colleges and universities in the United States who
had hoped to engage plaintiff as a speaker at their respective
institutions. Plaintiffs alleged that the challenged sections of the Act,
which declare that any alien who is, or at any time has been, a
member of certain leftist and extremist political organizations is
ineligible for a visa and excluded from admission to the United States,
imposed a prior restraint on constitutionally protected communication and predicated exclusion on belief and advocacy not allied with
unlawful speech or conduct. The United States Supreme Court
reversed the three-judge district court and held that Congress had
delegated to the Attorney General its plenary power to exclude aliens
or to prescribe the conditions of their entry into this country.
Consequently, the courts will not look behind the Attorney General's
decision nor test it by balancing its justification against the first
amendment rights of those who seek personal communication with
the alien applicant, unless it is shown that the refusal to waive the
statutory exclusion was not for a legitimate reason. Kleindienst v.
Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).

4. CONTRACTS
IN ORDER To PRECLUDE RECOVERY FOR BAGGAGE DAMAGE
THE

WARSAW

CONVENTION

THE AIR CARRIER MUST

UNDER

ADEQUATELY

INFORM ITS PASSENGERS OF THE THREE DAY PERIOD DURING WHICH
WRITTEN CLAIMS MUST BE FILED

Plaintiff's baggage was damaged while being carried from St.
Maarten to New York on defendant's airline. After presentation of
plaintiff's evidence at trial, defendant moved to dismiss the action on
plaintiff's failure to show that he had submitted a written complaint
Fall, 1972
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to the carrier within three days of the damage as required by the
Warsaw Convention, 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1970). Plaintiff had orally
informed the carrier of the damage within three days, but had not
discovered the requirement for written complaint until more than
three days had elapsed. The New York trial court concluded that
although the treaty does require timely written notice of claim, the
requirement was too well-hidden in the Lilliputian print of the
conditions of contract on the ticket to be enforceable. The three day
period operates as a limitation on liability, but it must be adequately
disclosed to the passenger in advance or it will be deemed abandoned.
Sofranski v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 68 Misc. 2d 402, 326
N.Y.S.2d 870 (Civ. Ct. 1972).

5. IMPORT-EXPORT
IMPOSITION

OF

SIGNIFICANTLY

CITY

FRANCHISE

MODIFIED AFTER

TAX

ARRIVAL

ON

IMPORTED

GOODS

IN THE UNITED STATES

HELD NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL

The Finance Administrator for the City of New York found a
deficiency in the gross receipts declared by petitioner, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of a French automobile manufacturer, for the sale of
automobiles imported from France. All of the cars imported by
petitioner required some modification after their delivery to the
United States; those sold wholesale were refitted at petitioner's
warehouse with only a few accessories, while those sold at retail were
modified with domestic optional equipment to suit the individual
purchasers. Although the United States Constitution, art. I, § 10, bars
state imposition of tax on imports, the New York Court of Appeals
held that Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827),
permitted the city franchise tax on imported goods that, because of
modifications effected in the United States, have not preserved their
character as imports and have become intermingled with locally
manufactured products. The court held taxable the income derived
from the retail sales of automobiles that had undergone considerable
transformation in this country, but the income from wholesale sales,
where the changes made did not affect the essential character of the
product, was held nontaxable. Citroen Cars Corp. v. New York Dep't
of Finance, 30 N.Y.2d 300, 283 N.E.2d 758, 332 N.Y.S.2d 882 (1972).
Vol. 6-No. 1
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6.
ICAO

COUNCIL
OVERFLIGHTS
AVIATION

JURISDICTION

JURISDICTION To DECIDE WHETHER PAKISTAN
VIOLATED
THE CHICAGO
INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL
HAS

CONVENTION

AND

THE

INTERNATIONAL

AIR

SERVICES

TRANSIT AGREEMENT

The Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) assumed jurisdiction over Pakistan's application and
complaint, which alleged that the suspension by India of Pakistan civil
aircraft flights over Indian territory constituted a breach of the
Chicago International Civil Aviation Convention of 1944 and the
International Air Services Transit Agreement of 1944. India appealed
ICAO's ruling on the ground that the Council did not have jurisdiction
to hear any disputes on the issue of overflights because the Chicago
Convention and the Transit Agreement had been suspended between
the two states. Pakistan argued that India had no right to appeal the
Council's decision, since article 84 of the Chicago Convention and
article II, § 2, of the Transit Agreement periit an appeal only from a
decision of the Council on the merits of the dispute. The Court
rejected Pakistan's objections, reasoning that for purposes of the
jurisdictional clauses of these treaties the final decisions of the Council
on its competence should not be distinguished from final decisions on
the merits. Noting that the dispute centered about the interpretation
or application of the treaties, the Court held that the Council had
jurisdiction to entertain Pakistan's application and complaint. The
Court determined that the competence of the tribunal is controlled by
the character of the dispute and the issues presented, not by the
defenses on the merits. India v. Pakistan, [1972] I.C.J. Gen. List No.
54, 11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1080 (1972).
THE IMMIGRATION AND
CONTRACTOR ACT

Do

NATIONALITY ACT AND THE FARM LABOR
NOT PROVIDE PRIVATE RIGHTS OF ACTION

Three separate civil actions were consolidated for appeal because
each case involved the same central issue: whether a private right of
action will be implied from a federal regulatory statute. In Chavez,
appellants, domestic farm workers, alleged that appellees, domestic
employers, had employed Mexicans who had illegally entered the
United States. Because of this situation, appellants alleged that they
had been deprived of work and that their wages had been depressed.
Appellants claimed standing to sue for damages under the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § § 1101 et seq. (1971). In Sanchez and
Olguin, migrant workers claimed a private right of action under the
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Farm Labor Contractor Registration Act of 1963, 7 U.S.C.A. § §
2041-53 (Supp. 1970). Appellants sought damages for breach of
contract and for various violations of the Act. In both cases the
appellants urged the court to find that the legislative purpose of each
statute implied a private remedy. Furthermore, appellants claimed
that governmental agencies were "grossly inadequate" in enforcing the
statutes and that the instant court therefore should enforce the Acts.
The court held that in the absence of congressional intent to provide
for private causes of action under these statutes, the court was
precluded from fashioning its own remedies; moreover, the court
concluded that the issue raised by these cases was a political question
beyond the jurisdiction of the courts. Chavez v. FreshpictFoods, Inc.,
456 F.2d 890 (10th Cir. 1972).

THE
REPUBLIC
OF CHINA
MAY
CRIMINAL OFEENSES COMMITTED

EXERCISE
IN CHINA

JURISDICTION
OVER
BY UNITED STATES

MILITARY PERSONNEL UNDER THE STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

Plaintiff, a member of the United States Air Force stationed in
Taiwan, was arrested at a Chinese residence and charged with illegal
possession of drugs. He sought an injunction to prevent his transfer to
the civilian custody of the Chinese Government and to compel the Air
Force to transport him to the United States for trial. The federal
district court held that since plaintiff's misconduct did not arise in the
performance of his official duties, the status of forces agreement
between the United States and the Republic of China allowed China
to exercise criminal jurisdiction over this type of case. The
international executive agreement lawfully precluded the court from
assuming jurisdiction over the subject matter of plaintiff's action and
the United States was obliged to surrender custody of plaintiff to
Chinese authorities. Starks v. Seamans, 339 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Wisc.
1972).
FEDERAL COURTS CANNOT GRANT INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST
PICKETING BY LABOR UNIONS OF FOREIGN VESSELS IN
UNITED
STATES PORTS

Plaintiff, the Port of Houston Authority, brought this action to
enjoin six defendant unions from maintaining peaceful, informational
picket lines against three foreign vessels in the Port of Houston.
Defendants sought to publicize alleged declining job opportunities and
substandard wages and working conditions for American seamen
caused by the use of foreign vessels. Plaintiff contended that since the
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vessels could not be unloaded, the picketing constituted both an
interference with foreign commerce, which is protected by bilateral
treaties, and a substantial loss of its income. The District Court for the
Southern District of Texas ruled that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29
U.S.C. § § 101-15, precluded it from assuming jurisdiction to grant
injunctive relief. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed, following
Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Panama Steamship Co., 362 U.S. 365
(1960), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the

Norris-LaGuardia Act contained no exception for interference with
foreign trade or commerce and denied injunctive relief in a similar
factual situation. Port of Houston Authority v. International
Organizationof Masters, 456 F.2d 50 (5th Cir. 1972).

ECONOMIC BENEFITS DERIVED FROM PATENT LICENSING AGREEMENT
FOUND

SUFFICIENT

TO

SUBJECT

FOREIGN

MANUFACTURERS

TO

FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION UNDER STATE LONG-ARM STATUTE

Appellants, British manufacturers, appealed a federal district
court order denying their motion to quash service of process because
of lack of in personam jurisdiction. Service had been effected pursuant
to the Illinois long-arm statute in a civil antitrust action. Appellants'
only contacts with Illinois were as parties to a patent licensing

arrangement with an Illinois licensee and as visitors in Illinois to
discuss a suit being litigated in another state. Appellants had no office
or property in Illinois, and all their manufacturing was done in Great

Britain. In addition, title to the manufactured goods passed to their
customers in Great Britain. The Seventh Circuit, emphasizing the
importance of the continuing economic control that appellants
maintained over their Illinois licensees and the profits and royalties

received from Illinois sales, held that in personam jurisdiction had
been attained properly under the state long-arm statute. Fisons Ltd. v.
United States, 458 F.2d 1241 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 405 U.S.

1041 (1972).
FEDERAL

COURTS

HAVE JURISDICTION

OVER

FOREIGN

CORPORA-

TIONS AND FOREIGN NATIONALS ENTERING THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE PURPOSE OF INDUCING PERSONS To INVEST ABROAD

Plaintiff, an American corporation, contracted in Pennsylvania
with defendants, Spanish citizens and corporations, to exchange
76,000 shares of its common stock for defendants' fifty per cent

interest in five Spanish corporations. Plaintiff became concerned
about the financial records of the Spanish corporations and after an
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audit by an American accounting firm, sought rescission of the
contract, damages and cancellation of future loan obligations.
Plaintiff claimed that defendants had committed common law fraud
and had violated section 10 (b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and
Exchange Act of 1934. Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over them and that plaintiff
had refused to submit his complaint to arbitration as stipulated in the
contract. The court declared that before there could be any
arbitration on damages, it must first determine whether there were
grounds for rescission, because the arbitration panel could not grant
rescission. In addition, the court held that jurisdiction over the five
Spanish corporations was proper under the tests announced in
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). When a
foreign corporate officer comes into the United States to induce a
person to purchase stock and to extend loans, and signs a contract in
the United States, the corporation has had sufficient contacts within
the country to satisfy jurisdictional requirements. Alco Standard
Corp. v. Benalal, 345 F. Supp. 14 (E.D. Pa. 1972).

THE MERE ARRIVAL OF DAMAGED GOODS AT A PORT IN ILLINOIS Is
NOT A SUFFICIENT BASIS ON WHICH To PREDICATE SUBSTITUTED

SERVICE OF PROCESS UNDER THE ILLINOIS NONRESIDENT WATERCRAFT OPERATORS' ACT

Plaintiff brought proceedings in admiralty against the vessel and its
British owner when his goods arrived in the Port of Chicago from the
Port of Antwerp, Belgium, in damaged condition. Service of process
was made on the Illinois Secretary of State pursuant to the Illinois
Non-Resident Watercraft Operators' Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 110, §
263b (1969), which permits such service if the cause of action arose
from a negligent act or omission committed in Illinois waters.
Defendant moved to quash service of process on the ground that the
libel failed to allege actions or omissions in Illinois waters sufficient to
bring the cause within the provisions of the Act. Plaintiff contended
that the mere arrival of the goods in a damaged condition in Chicago
constituted sufficient incidents to show damages growing out of the
use of Illinois waters. The court, following Valkenburg, K.G. v. The
S.S. Henry Denny, 295 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1961), granted defendant's
motion to quash service of process, declaring that the cargo's arrival in
damaged condition does not sufficiently prove that the deterioration
of the cargo grew out of the use of Illinois waters. Nimpex
International, Inc. v. S.S. Monksgarth, 342 F. Supp. 510 (N.D. Ill.
1971).
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7.

TRADE REGULATION

COMITY BETWEEN NATIONS DOES NOT REQUIRE DISMISSAL IN A CASE
INVOLVING THE ANTITRUST ACTIVITIES OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION
IN THE UNITED STATES

Plaintiff, a Swiss company, contracted with defendant, a French
corporation, for the transportation of chemical commodities from the
United States to Europe. Since defendant maintained offices in and
conducted business within the State of New York, plaintiff brought an
action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York, alleging defendant's breach of the charter party agreement
and failure to honor plaintiff's exercise of an option to extend the
charter party agreement. In a second but related action, plaintiff
charged defendant with conspiring to fix prices and monopolization of
the transportation of chemical products and sought treble damages
under the Sherman Act. Defendant challenged the court's jurisdiction
in both actions on the basis of a Franco-Swiss treaty that required that
suits between nationals of France and Switzerland be brought in the
courts of the defendant's nation. The district court held that Fed. R.
Civ. P. 17(b), which subjects corporations to suit in the state of their
incorporation, gave the court jurisdiction to hear both actions. The
Second Circuit, however, held that the pleadings on the first action
revealed no basis for federal jurisdiction, but found that the parties'
presence in the United States as business entities active in the State of
New York evidenced sufficient contacts with this country to permit a
federal court to retain subject matter jurisdiction over the antitrust
action. Moreover, the strong policy embodied in the Sherman Act
against allowing monopolies in the United States overrides
considerations of comity between nations. Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich
v. Societe Anonyme de Gerance et D'Armament, 451 F.2d 727 (2d
Cir. 1971).

PRIOR USE

OF A TRADEMARK

ENTITLE ITS OWNER

To

IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY

CLAIM EXCLUSIVE

DOES NOT

TRADEMARK RIGHTS IN

THE UNITED STATES

Plaintiff, a large and established toiletries and cosmetics
manufacturing firm doing business as "Johnson and Johnson,"
alleged trademark infringement and unfair competition and brought
action under the Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq.
(1970), for monetary damages and injunctive relief against defendant,
a firm owned by Cuban immigrants doing business in California as
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"Johnson Laboratories." Defendant manufactured and sold a toilet
water product, "Agua de Colonia, Johnson," which formerly had been
produced in Cuba by Manuel Johnson, now deceased. The United
States market for this product was comprised primarily of Cuban
refugees. The federal district court found that defendant's use of the
trade name created a likelihood of confusion, might preclude plaintiff
from expanding its business to the manufacture of a similar product,
and concluded that the prior use of a trademark in a foreign country
does not entitle its owner to claim exclusive trademark rights in the
United States against one who, in good faith, has adopted a similar
trademark prior to the entry of the foreigner into the domestic
market. Furthermore, the court determined that defendant's
restriction of its sales to the so-called Cuban submarket did not
negate the finding of a likelihood of confusion and granted summary
judgment for plaintiff. Johnson & Johnson v. Diaz, 339 F. Supp. 60
(C.D. Cal. 1971).

EXPROPRIATION AND
A

FOREIGN

DISSOLUTION OF A FOREIGN CORPORATION BY

SOVEREIGN NEITHER

DEPRIVES

FORMER

OWNERS AND

FIDUCIARIES OF THE RIGHT To MAKE AN EFFECTIVE ASSIGNMENT OF
A

REGISTERED

UNITED

STATES

TRADEMARK

NOR

CANCELS

THAT

TRADEMARK

Former owners of a Cuban brewery corporation that had been
confiscated by the Castro regime, and Maltina corporation, the
American assignee of the Cuban brewery's trademark registered in the
United States Patent Office, sought damages and injunctive relief
against defendant brewery for alleged infringement activities. Plaintiffs
claimed that the "Cerveza Cristal" trademark had been properly
assigned to Maltina, even though the Cuban brewery had been
dissolved in accordance with Cuban law. Defendants moved for
summary judgment on the ground that, since the Cuban corporation
had ceased to exist under Cuban law, plaintiff had no further rights in
the United States trademark and, consequently, defendant was
privileged to market its beer under the "Cerveza Cristal" label. The
federal district court granted summary judgment for defendant. On
appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed. Although the federal court was
precluded from considering the propriety of the Cuban Government's
expropriation of the assets of the brewery within Cuba, the
corporation retained a de facto existence in the United States and the
disposition of property with an American situs was beyond the
territorial reach of the expropriating government. The court reserved
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the question whether any particular individual or group of individuals
had the right to act in the United States on behalf of an enterprise
dissolved by a foreign sovereign and held only that the expropriation
and dissolution of the Cuban corporation neither deprived the former
owners and fiduciaries of the corporation of the right to make an
effective assignment of the United States trademark nor cancelled that
trademark. Maltina Corp. v. Cawy Bottling Co., 462 F.2d 1021 (5th
Cir. 1972), rehearingand rehearingen bane denied, July 11, 1972.
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